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ABSTRACT
A variety of state, federal, and international laws theoretically
prohibit sexual abuse of prisoners by the guards hired by the state
to oversee them. Nevertheless, sexual abuse of female prisoners by
male prison guards is a rampant phenomenon that the law has thus
far failed to remedy. Cross-gender supervision policies exacerbate
the problem by placing women in situations in which they have no
escape from their attackers. These policies, which are as dangerous
for some prisoners as they are humiliating to all prisoners, have
generally withstood scrutiny in courts.
This note attempts to reframe the arguments challenging cross-
gender supervision policies and proposes a more narrowly tailored
constitutional claim against them. Clearly establishing the causal
link between cross-gender supervision policies and custodial sexual
abuse could convince courts to enjoin prisons from hiring male guards
to oversee female prisoners in contact positions. Such a result would
hopefully both stem the tide of sexual abuse in prisons while simul-
taneously improving conditions of confinement for female prisoners
by restricting prisons from adopting these degrading policies.
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INTRODUCTION
The sadistic abuse and sexual humiliation by
American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison has
shocked most Americans - but not those of us
familiar with U.S. jails and prisons. In American
prisons today, wanton staff brutality and degrading
treatment of inmates occur across the country with
distressing frequency .... Both men and women
prisoners - but especially women -face staff rape
and sexual abuse.'
[P]ermitting male correctional employees to pat
down women contributes to the problem of sexual
degradation of women in prison and heightens the
risk of staff sexual abuse.2
Multiple international laws and treaties prohibit cross-gender
supervision. For example, Article 17 of the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights provides that all people have a right to
privacy,' a provision that some people interpret as prohibiting cross-
gender pat-frisk searches in prisons.4 The United Nations has en-
couraged all member nations to implement its Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.5 Rule 53(3) of the Standard
Minimum Rules states that "[w] omen prisoners shall be attended and
supervised only by women officers."6 Strangely, in the same year that
1. Jamie Fellner, Esq., Commentary, Prisoner Abuse: How Different are U.S.
Prisons?, HUMANRIGHTS WATCH, May 14, 2004, http://hrw.org/englishldocs/2004/05/14/
usdom8583.htm.
2. Letter from Jamie Fellner, Director, U.S. Program Human Rights Watch, to
Jeanne Woodford, Director, California Department of Corrections (Dec. 9,2004), available
at http://hrw.org/englishldocs/2004/12/16/usdom9906.htm.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 177.
4. Letter from Jamie Feller, Director, U.S. Program Human Rights Watch, to
Jeanne Woodford, Director, California Department of Corrections, supra note 2.
5. G.A. Res. 3144, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/9425
(Dec. 14, 1973).
6. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N.
Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N.
Doc. E/5988 (1977) [hereinafter UN Standard Minimum Rules]. The United Nations has
also stated that prison guards should only perform body searches on prisoners of the
same sex. Compilation of General Comment and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/Rev. 3, gen'l cmt. 18 (Aug. 15, 1997).
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the United Nations expanded the scope of these policies, 7 the prev-
alence of cross-gender supervision' in both male and female prisons
in the United States began to increase.9 Today, all federal and state
prisons allow prison guards to supervise prison inmates of the oppo-
site sex. 10 According to Amnesty International, seventy percent of
federal prison guards are men 1 and forty-one percent of guards in
the average state correctional center who work with female inmates
are men.
12
The extent to which prison guards may observe or search
opposite-sex inmates varies from prison to prison throughout the
United States.13 Some prisons limit observation of opposite-sex in-
mates to "infrequent and casual observation, or observation at a dis-
tance,""' while others allow observation of inmates while dressing,
showering, and using the toilet. " Some prisons have allowed prison
7. E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977)
(extending Standard Minimum Rules to "persons arrested or imprisoned without charge).
8. For the purposes of this note, the phrase cross-gender supervision refers generally
to any prison policy that allows prison guards to observe or search prison inmates of the
opposite sex, whereas the phrase cross-gender surveillance specifically refers to prison
policies that allow prison guards to observe inmates while sleeping, dressing, showering,
using the toilet, and in any other state of undress. Unless stated otherwise, the latter
phrase refers to those policies that allow cross-gender surveillance without requiring a
second guard of the opposite sex to be present.
9. Martin A. Geer, Protection of Female Prisoners: Dissolving Standards of Decency,
2 MARGINS 175, 177-78 (2002); James B. Jacobs, The Sexual Integration of the Prison
Guard's Force: A Few Comments on Dothard v. Rawlinson, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 389, 389
(1979).
10. CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA, FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN INITIATIVE:
CROSS-GENDER STAFFING IN Fsw FACILITIES (Mar. 11, 2005), http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/
text/prgrm/fsw/fsw30/fsw30e05_e.shtml.
11. Amnesty International, Women's Human Rights: Women in Prison, http://www
.amnestyusa.org/women/womeninprison.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
12. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE": VIOLATIONS OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY 51-52 (1999), available at http://web.amnesty
.org/library/IndexengAMR510011999. Kansas, California, and Idaho had the highest per-
centage of male guards working with female prisoners at seventy-two percent in Kansas
and sixty-six percent in California and Idaho. Id.
13. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 1 49, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.2
(Jan. 4, 1999).
14. Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1985).
15. Coomaraswamy, supra note 13, 63, 97; see also Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d
899, 902-04 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that male guards who transferred a naked female
pre-trial detainee down a hallway and "strapped her to [a] restrainer board face-down,
naked, and in a spread-eagle position" did not violate prisoner's Fourth Amendment
rights); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150-51 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding a female guard's
observation of a nude male inmate to be constitutional); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093,
1102 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding a female guard's observation of nude male inmates to be
constitutional).
844 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:841
guards to conduct pat-frisks of clothed inmates of the opposite sex,16
while others have allowed guards to observe and to conduct strip
searches 7 and body-cavity searches"8 of opposite-sex inmates.
Although these policies are often humiliating to prison inmates
of both sexes, cross-gender supervision can have particularly trauma-
tizing effects on female prisoners. Various studies estimate that forty
to eighty-eight percent of female prisoners have histories of sexual
or physical abuse.19 Female prisoners with a history of sexual abuse
are often more fearful of male guards,2 ° are more traumatized by
cross-gender supervision and searches,2 and become more vulnerable
to sexual assaults while incarcerated.22 In addition to being degrad-
ing, cross-gender supervision in women's prisons greatly increases
the frequency of sexual abuse against female prisoners.2
Sexual assault is virtually a part of everyday life in women's
prisons.24 Although women comprise only seven percent of the state
prison population, forty-six percent of sexual abuse victims in state
prisons are women." Because women constitute the fastest-growing
16. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1522 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding random pat-frisks
of female inmates by male guards unconstitutional); see also Gunter, 917 F.2d at 1099-
1100 (holding pat-frisk of male inmates by female guards to be constitutional); Madyun
v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a pat-frisk of a male inmate
by a female guard did not violate prisoner's First Amendment rights).
17. Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 184, 189 (7th Cir. 1994) (reversing dismissal of
a male inmate's constitutional challenges to strip search conducted by a female guard);
Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992) (addressing a male inmate's
Fourth and Eighth Amendment challenges to an outdoor strip search observed by several
female guards).
18. Elliott v. Morgan, 111 Fed. Appx. 345, 346 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that male
prisoner had no clearly established Fourth Amendment right to remain free from routine
cross-gender body-cavity searches); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 616,620 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that male inmate had no constitutional right to privacy that prohibited
female guards from subjecting him to regular body-cavity searches); Bonitz v. Fair, 804
F.2d 164, 169, 173 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that female inmates had a Fourth Amendment
right to remain free from unhygienic body-cavity searches conducted by female officers
in the presence of male guards).
19. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Beyond Modesty: Privacy in Prison and the Risk of Sexual
Abuse, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 753 (2005).
20. See id. at 754.
21. Amy Laderberg, Note, The 'Dirty Little Secret" Why Class Actions Have Emerged
as the Only Viable Optionfor Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the Subjective Prong
of the Eighth Amendment in Suits for Custodial SexualAbuse, 40WM. &MARYL. REV. 323,
338-39 (1998).
22. Id.
23. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S.
STATE PRISONS 1 (1996), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996[Usl.htm.
24. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 12; Coomaraswamy, supra note 13 at
59; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23; see also infra Part II.
25. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 210333, SEXUAL VIOLENCE
REPORTED BYCORRECTIONALAUTHORITIES, 2004, at 8(2005), available at http://www.ojp
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segment of the United States prison population,26 one can only expect
the frequency of sexual abuse against female prisoners to rise. Never-
theless, the unfortunate truth is that in most circumstances female
inmates will never have the opportunity to make their voices heard
in court. In some situations victims will not report abuse for fear of
retaliation.27 In other situations local politics may prevent bringing
attackers to justice. 28 Furthermore, prison inmates often face legal
barriers to gaining access to the courts, such as the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, which restricts the kinds of cases that inmates can liti-
gate.29 Lack of resources and ignorance of their rights may also pre-
vent some inmates from accusing their attackers or from seeking
relief in the courts.
Even in those circumstances when an inmate does have the op-
portunity to bring her case before a court, few inmates prevail on con-
stitutional challenges to any kind of condition of confinement. Both
male and female prison inmates have challenged sexual assault and
cross-gender supervision policies on Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds with little success.3 ° Female inmates challeng-
ing custodial sexual abuse in prisons often face the additional and
often insurmountable challenge of proving their claims in court.3'
Part III addresses challenges that prison inmates have made under
the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the obstacles
that prisoners face when litigating them. Because prison inmates are
.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/svrca04.pdf (collecting data on prison rape pursuant to the Prison
Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15603 (Supp. IV 2005)).
26. JOHN IRWIN, VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG, AMERICA'S ONE MILLION
NONVIOLENT PRISONERS 7(1999), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/downloads/
onemillionnonviolentoffenders.pdf; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OFJUST. STAT.,
NCJ 175688, WOMENOFFENDERS 6(1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/wo.pdf (finding that the population of women involved in corrections had grown forty-
eight percent between 1990 and 1998, as opposed to twenty-seven percent for the male
population).
27. See Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15YALEJ.L. &FEMINISM225,
227 (2003).
28. Although U.S. v. Lanier did not deal with sexual abuse in the prison context, it
is a good example of local politics standing in the way of justice for victims of sexual abuse.
In Lanier, federal prosecutors had to bring charges of sexual assault against a state judge
because the state district attorney who had jurisdiction over the case was the defendant's
brother. U.S. v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 646 (6th Cir. 1994); Joy Ward, The Judge Who Got
Off, ON THE ISSUES: THE PROGRESSIVE WOMEN'S Q., Fall 1996, http://www.ontheissues
magazine.comlf96judge.html ("Nothing happened in Dyer County that the Laniers could
not control.").
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (Supp. IV 2005).
30. See Buchanan, supra note 19, at 759; see also infra Part II.
31. See Laderberg, supra note 21, at 326-29 (arguing that a single female prisoner
often cannot satisfy the evidentiary requirements of an Eighth Amendment suit without
testimony from other inmates regarding custodial sexual abuse).
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a politically unpopular group with limited access to the courts and
limited success there, new proposals for legal challenges to condi-
tions of confinement are important to remedy the inhumane treat-
ment of prisoners.
Female prisoners have had marginally better success than male
prisoners in challenging cross-gender supervision and searches in
prisons.32 Strangely, female prisoners have had much less success
challenging repeated sexual abuse perpetrated by prison guards.33
The limited successes of female prisoners in court thus far have un-
fortunately done little to end the practice of cross-gender supervision
nationwide.' Because cross-gender supervision policies lead to an in-
crease in the frequency of sexual abuse against female prisoners,35
challenging these specific policies may indirectly lead to a correspond-
ing decrease in sexual abuse of prisoners.
Some prisons, recognizing that cross-gender supervision violates
prisoners' rights and poses a danger to those prisoners' mental and
physical health, have unilaterally decided to restrict access of prison
guards to opposite sex prisoners.36 Other prisons have reached the
same result but out of concern for the safety of female guards and
not out of concern for the rights of prisoners." Both situations have
generated much litigation from prison guards under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 The Supreme Court decided such a case in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, the only Supreme Court case to recognize a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) to Title VII.39 Although
the Supreme Court allowed the prison in Dothard to discriminate
against female prison guards, the stream of litigation continued, en-
couraging prison systems to implement cross-gender supervision
policies.4 °
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part III.
34. CORRECTIONAL SERVICE OF CANADA, supra note 10.
35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too FAMILIAR: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S.
STATE PRISONS 1 (1996), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Usl.htm.
36. E.g., Everson v. Michigan Dep't. of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 739-40, 753 (6th Cir. 2004)
(finding a female bona fide occupational qualification for a women's prison notorious for
"rampant" sexual abuse).
37. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-37 (1977).
38. John Dwight Ingram, Prison Guards and Inmates of Opposite Genders: Equal
Employment Opportunity Versus Right of Privacy, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 3, 12
(2000).
39. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-37 (allowing a male prison system to discriminate against
women in hiring practices).
40. The topic of discriminatory employment practices in the prison setting lies beyond
the scope of this note, but it is worth mentioning because much Title VII litigation in this
area touches upon prisoners' privacy rights. More importantly, as the legal system ad-
dresses the civil rights of prisoners, it must also consider the employment rights of female
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This note proposes a theory of the law that would help to reduce
both custodial sexual abuse and cross-gender supervision policies.
Recognition of a constitutional right to remain free from sexual abuse
from one's prison guards opens the door to new challenges to the con-
stitutionality of cross-gender supervision of female prison inmates.
Part I discusses the problem of custodial sexual abuse in women's
prisons and how it relates to cross-gender supervision. Part II ana-
lyzes the constitutional challenges to cross-gender supervision that
prisoners have raised over the past thirty years. Part III explains
how the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give rise to the right
of prison inmates to remain free from rape by prison guards. Part IV
argues that female prisoners can challenge not only sexual abuse but
also cross-gender surveillance in prisons as violating these rights.
This part further discusses the changes in prison policies that would
result if female prisoners were able to successfully litigate these
constitutional claims.41 Holding prisons and prison administrators
liable whenever prison guards sexually abuse prisoners would pres-
sure prisons and legislatures to abandon cross-gender surveillance
policies, thereby preventing future instances of sexual abuse before
they occur. Successful litigation of such claims would reduce the fre-
quency of sexual assaults in women's prisons and would lead to re-
strictions on the degrading practice of cross-gender supervision.
I. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN WOMEN'S PRISONS
Multiple factors increase the frequency of rape in women's
prisons. Poor training of prison guards and abandonment of re-
habilitation goals also increase the frequency of prison rape,42 as do
failures to investigate and prosecute prison rape.43 Overcrowding of
prisons and an inability to sufficiently staff prisons to oversee large
prison guards and find some way to accommodate those rights without degrading inmates
or putting inmates in harm's way. For a discussion of the clash that cross-gender super-
vision creates between two different feminist values (support of equal employment versus
protecting women from sexual abuse), see Ashlie E. Case, Case Comment, Conflicting
Ferninisms and the Rights of Women Prisoners, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 309 (2005). See
also Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An
Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985);
Mary Ann Farkas & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Female Correctional Officers and Prisoner
Privacy, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 995 (1997); Ingram, supra note 38.
41. See infra Part IV.B.
42. See Carla I. Barrett, Note, Does the Prison Rape Elimination Act Adequately
Address the Problems Posed by Prison Overcrowding? If Not, What Will?, 39 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 391, 427 (2005).
43. James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme Court and
Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433, 471-72 (2003).
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populations serve to exacerbate the problem.4 4 Professor of Correc-
tional Law James Robertson has noted that "the very layout of many
prisons renders their architecture an accessory to rape" by making
detection of sexual attacks difficult.45
The increased implementation of cross-gender supervision poli-
cies has also led to an increase in sexual assaults.46 Pursuant to the
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
compiled data on prison rape for 2004; although these statistics do
not report the percentage of custodial sexual abuse cases in which
male guards abuse female prisoners, they do imply a high percentage
of cross-gender sexual abuse incidents.47 In local jails throughout the
United States, seventy percent of victims of custodial sexual mis-
conduct were women, whereas sixty-five percent of the perpetrators
were male guards.45 State prisons present a different situation, in
which thirty-one percent of such victims were female and thirty-three
percent of the perpetrators were male. 49 This lower percentage makes
more sense when one considers that local jails have almost double
the percentage of female inmates as state prisons.5 °
Sexual abuse of female prisoners by male guards has long been
a problem in the United States. As early as 1869, prison reformers
were campaigning for remedies to this problem.51 Indiana estab-
lished the first separate women's prison in 1874, and by 1940 almost
half of the United States had separate prison facilities for women."
In these separate facilities, all the guards were female.53 After the
1972 Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prisons again
began hiring prison guards to supervise opposite-sex inmates.5 4 This
sudden onset of cross-gender supervision prompted many male pris-
oners to file lawsuits, but the 'less litigious and outspoken" population
44. Barrett, supra note 42, at 427.
45. Robertson, supra note 43, at 472-73.
46. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 20-22.
47. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 25, at 8.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. U.S. DEP'TOFJUST., BUREAUOFJUST. STAT., NCJ208801, PRISONANDJAIL INMATES
ATMIDYEAR 2004, at 5,8 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/abstractlpjim04
.htm (reporting that women constituted 12.3% of the local jail population but only 6.9%
of the state and federal prison population in 2004; figures for 2003 were 11.9% and 6.9%).
51. Anthea Dinos, Custodial Sexual Abuse: Enforcing Long-Awaited Policies Designed
to Protect Female Prisoners, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 282 (2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining the Privacy Rights of
Women Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 21 (1999).
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of female prisoners created less litigation.55 The next section ad-
dresses some of these challenges.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO CROSS-GENDER SUPERVISION
United States case law makes challenges to both cross-gender
supervision policies and custodial sexual abuse extremely difficult
for prisoners to litigate successfully. Although the Supreme Court
has never addressed whether cross-gender supervision violates
the constitutional rights of prisoners, 6 almost every federal court
of appeals has heard at least one case in this area. Male prisoners
have initiated the majority of litigation challenging the constitution-
ality of cross-gender supervision.5" This section analyzes the Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims that inmates have raised
against cross-gender supervision and sexual assault.
A. Fourth Amendment Claims
Although courts normally decide Fourth Amendment58 claims
according to a strict scrutiny standard,59 the Supreme Court has
created a less strenuous test in the prison context.6 ° Outside the
prison context, courts follow a two-part test to determine the con-
stitutionality of a search.61 Courts ask (1) whether the defendant
had a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether that expec-
tation of privacy is one that society is reasonably willing to recog-
nize.62 In the prison context, courts follow the same test but afford
great deference to prison officials and will find a violation of a pris-
oner's Fourth Amendment rights only if the infringement is not
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."6 Applying
this test involves consideration of four factors:
55. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 21.
56. The Court has refused to hear four such cases. Jennifer Weiser, The Fourth
Amendment Rights of Female Inmates to be Free from Cross-Gender Pat-Frisks, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 31, 41 n.67 (2002).
57. Smith, supra note 27, at 246.
58. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. Const.
amend. IV.
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1967).
60. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1986).
61. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
62. Id.
63. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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(1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the
prison policy and the legitimate governmental interest
asserted to justify it;
(2) the existence of alternative means for inmates to exercise
their constitutional rights;
(3) the impact that accommodation of these constitutional
rights may have on other guards and inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources; and
(4) the absence of ready alternatives as evidence of the reason-
ableness of the regulation.'
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that "convicted prison-
ers do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their con-
viction and confinement in prison,"" prisoners have had little success
in challenging cross-gender supervision under this more deferential
standard. This section categorizes these challenges based on the
apparent severity of the intrusion imposed on prisoners.
1. Cross-Gender Pat Frisks
The Seventh Circuit heard one of the first Fourth Amendment
challenges to any kind of cross-gender supervision of prisoners in
Madyun v. Franzen in 1983.66 In Madyun, the complainant, a male
prisoner, refused to allow a female prison guard to pat-frisk him be-
cause his Islamic faith prohibited such a search.67 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that such a search was reasonably related to
the substantial state interests of ensuring security within the prison
and of providing equal employment rights to female prison guards.6"
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar result in Timm v. Gunter.69
Although the court did not specifically cite the Fourth Amendment,
it held that neither cross-gender pat-frisks" nor cross-gender surveil-
lance71 violated prisoners' rights to privacy. The Ninth Circuit held
64. Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 1992) (summarizing the test
established by the Supreme Court in Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91).
65. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) (holding that body-cavity searches do
not violate prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights).
66. 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 956.
68. Id. at 960. In so deciding, the Court referenced dicta from a similar case in which
a male inmate from the same prison challenged the constitutionality of cross-gender
pat-frisks under the Eighth Amendment. See Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53-54 (7th
Cir. 1982).
69. 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990).
70. Id. at 1099-1101.
71. Id. at 1101-02.
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cross-gender pat-frisks to be unconstitutional in Jordan v. Gardner,
but it did so regarding an especially broad pat-frisk regulation and
based its decision on the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourth
Amendment.72 The Fourth Amendment therefore appears to be of no
avail to prisoners challenging cross-gender pat-frisk searches.
2. Cross-Gender Surveillance and Strip-Searches
Most federal Courts of Appeals have addressed the constitution-
ality of cross-gender surveillance and strip searches. Two of the first
federal cases challenging cross-gender surveillance of naked inmates
came before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the early 1980s.73
Both involved situations in which prison medical staff deprived the
plaintiff of clothes following a suicide attempt.74 In Lee v. Downs,
male prison guards restrained the plaintiff while a female nurse re-
moved her clothing.75 The plaintiff in Downs also raised Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims against the prison for a vaginal
search conducted by a female nurse while male guards physically re-
strained her.76 In Fisher v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, prison officials placed a pre-trial detainee, naked, in an iso-
lation cell for fifteen hours, during which time she heard male prison
guards making derogatory comments about her appearance.77 In both
cases, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that prisoners should not
have to expose their genitals involuntarily to members of the oppo-
site sex but qualified that acknowledgement with the words "[w]hen
not reasonably necessary."7 " In Lee, the court held that the first vio-
lation of privacy was unnecessary 9 but that the second, the vaginal
search in the presence of male guards, was reasonably necessary be-
cause male guards were stronger and therefore could more easily
restrain the "big and strong" inmate. 0 Furthermore, the nurse
conducted the search after the inmate had removed and burned the
paper gown provided her by the prison, and the Court therefore cal-
lously reasoned that "[s]ince her genital area was already in full view
72. See infra text accompanying notes 130-31.
73. Fisher v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982); Lee v.
Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981).
74. Fisher, 690 F.2d at 1136; Lee, 641 F.2d at 1118-19.
75. Lee, 641 F.2d at 1119.
76. Id.
77. Fisher, 690 F.2d at 1136.
78. Id. at 1142 (holding that "involuntary exposure in a state of nakedness to members
of the opposite sex [is constitutionally prohibited] unless that exposure was reasonably
necessary in maintaining... legal detention"); Lee, 641 F.2d at 1119.
79. Lee, 641 F.2d at 1119-20.
80. Id. at 1120-21.
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of the two male guards, it was not an horrendous additional invasion
of her right of privacy that they restrained her limbs while the female
nurse conducted the search.""1 In essence, conducting the vaginal
search in front of male guards was reasonable because the prisoner
had removed her own clothes, reasoning that appears disturbingly
similar to blaming the victim.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held multiple times that
cross-gender surveillance is constitutional. 2 In at least two cases, the
Sixth Circuit has held that female prison guards do not violate male
prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights by observing strip searches.8 3
The Seventh Circuit has held in favor of male prisoners regarding
cross-gender strip searches but not regarding cross-gender surveil-
lance.' As noted above, the Eighth Circuit held in Timm v. Gunter
that female prison guards did not violate the Fourth Amendment
rights of male prisoners by supervising them from a distance in
various states of undress.85 The Eight Circuit also held in favor of
prison guards in Hill v. McKinley, in which male guards who trans-
ferred a naked female pre-trial detainee down a hallway and "strapped
her to [a] restrainer board face-down, naked, and in a spread-eagle
position.""
The Ninth Circuit has addressed cross-gender supervision of
naked inmates on numerous occasions. That court first recognized
the privacy right of individuals "to shield one's unclothed figure from
[the] view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex"
in York v. Story.87 In Grummet v. Rushen, the court of appeals found
that allowing female guards to watch male inmates while dressing,
showering, and using the toilet was not a constitutional violation
81. Id. at 1121.
82. Tasby v. Lynaugh, 123 Fed.Appx. 614 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a strip search
of a male prisoner in front of female guards was not a constitutional violation); Sinclair
v. Stalder, 78 Fed.Appx. 987 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that female supervision of male
inmates is constitutional); Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744-45 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that prisoners' rights to bodily privacy were minimal and that cross-gender surveillance
of naked prisoners is constitutional); Barnett v. Collins, 940 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding cross-gender surveillance of showering prisoners to be constitutional).
83. Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912,916-17(6th Cir. 1992) (reversing jury verdict
in favor of a prisoner whom prison guards had strip-searched in front of several female
correctional officers); Roden v. Sowders, 84 Fed. Appx. 611 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of a female prison guard who had observed and allegedly
laughed at the strip search of a prisoner).
84. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
85. 917 F.2d 1093, 1101-02 (8th Cir. 1990).
86. Hill v. Mckinley, 311 F.3d 899, 901-02 (8th Cir. 2002).
87. 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that a police officer violated a woman's
constitutional rights by photographing her nude and distributing the pictures to other
police personnel).
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because this viewing was restricted to "infrequent and casual obser-
vation, or observation at a distance.""8 In Michenfelder v. Sumner
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against a male prison in-
mate because the presence of a female guard at one of his routine
strip searches was an isolated incident and because all other female
supervision was limited.89 Conversely, in Sepulveda v. Ramirez the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of a female parolee who filed a civil
rights suit after a male parole officer entered the bathroom stall
where the parolee was producing a urine sample.9 ° That case is of
little use to prison inmates because, as the court stated, "the con-
stitutional rights of parolees are... more extensive than those of
inmates."'" Also, at least one federal district court has called even
these limited holdings into question, claiming that the Court ac-
knowledged the right to bodily privacy in those cases because it felt
obligated to condemn such "obviously offensive" searches.92
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the existence of a limited
bodily privacy right in prisons in Fortner v. Thomas but refused to
address whether prison regulations that violated that right were con-
stitutional under Turner.93 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
recently reaffirmed that prisoners possess a limited bodily privacy
right in Boxer X v. Harris but again refused to address the merits
of the prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim.94 At least one Eleventh
Circuit district court has held that cross-gender surveillance of nude
prisoners does not violate the Fourth Amendment.9"
3. Cross-Gender Body Cavity Searches
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of body-cavity
searches generally in Bell v. Wolfish,9" but it has never addressed
cross-gender body cavity searches. At least four federal courts of ap-
peal have addressed prisoners' challenges to prison policy allowing
guards to conduct body-cavity searches of opposite sex inmates. The
88. 779 F.2d 491, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1985).
89. 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988).
90. 967 F.2d 1413, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1992) (deciding case under Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections of bodily privacy); see also infra Part III.C.
91. Sepulveda, 967 F.2d at 1416.
92. Hansen v. Cal. Dep't. of Corr., 920 F.Supp. 1480, 1496-99 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
93. Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993).
94. 437 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 2006).
95. Sinkfield v. Culliver, No. Civ.A. 03-0432-WS-M, 2005 WL 2665348, at *6-8 (S.D.
Ala. Sept. 28,2005), adopted, 2005 WL 2665354 (holding that female guards' viewing male
prisoners in shower did not violate Fourth Amendment).
96. 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).
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Fifth97 and Ninth98 Circuits have upheld these policies regarding
male prisoners, and the Fourth Circuit held in Lee v. Downs that
having male guards restrain a female inmate during a body-cavity
search can be reasonable and therefore constitutional.99 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals reached a different result in Bonitz v. Fair,
in which nine female prisoners challenged a series of body-cavity
searches performed in the presence of male prison guards."0 How-
ever, the circumstances of the searches in Bonitz were particularly
heinous in that they were disturbingly unhygienic, were performed
by guards instead of medical staff, involved repeated groping instead
of mere visual inspection, and did not make special provisions for one
plaintiff who was menstruating at the time.'01 In upholding the lower
court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
Court of Appeals based its decision almost entirely on the unreason-
ably intrusive and unhygienic nature of the search involved, mention-
ing the presence of male guards only in passing. 02 In short, there
appears to be no case law indicating that cross-gender body-cavity
searches are per se unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments"'0 3 has been "even less effective" than the Fourth Amend-
ment for prisoners challenging cross-gender supervision policies.0 4
Under the Supreme Court's current conditions-of-confinement juris-
prudence, a condition of confinement violates an inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights if (1) it inflicts an injury that is "sufficiently
serious"'0 5 and (2) the injury to the prisoner is "unnecessary and
wanton"'0 6 and committed with 'deliberate indifference' to inmate
health or safety."'0 7 Deliberate indifference is behavior beyond "mere
negligence" but requires a mental state less than knowledge or pur-
pose that harm will result.108
97. Elliott v. Morgan, 111 Fed. Appx. 345 (5th Cir. 2004).
98. Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 1997).
99. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (4th Cir. 1981).
100. 804 F.2d 164, 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 169.
102. Id. at 172-73.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
104. Jurado, supra note 54, at 35.
105. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
106. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)).
107. Id. (quoting Seiter, 501 U.S. at 302-03).
108. Id. at 835.
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The most startling failure of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
is its failure to protect prisoners from conditions of confinement that
result in sexual assault. Although courts may enter a verdict in favor
of sexual abuse victims against a specific guard, 109 they typically will
not do so against prisons, prison administrators, or communities that
adopt policies that lead to sexual abuse. 110 In Farmer v. Brennan the
Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a prison policy created
a substantial risk of sexual assault."' The plaintiff in Farmer was
a male-to-female transgender person incarcerated in the United
States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, an all-male prison,
where another inmate beat and raped her within two weeks of her
transfer to the general population."2 The plaintiff challenged the
conditions of her confinement, claiming that her placement in the
general population of a prison with a history of inmate assaults con-
stituted deliberate indifference to her safety." 3 In holding for the
defendants, the Court adopted a subjective test of deliberate indif-
ference under which a prison official violates a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights only if the official actually knows that the inmate is at
significant risk and nevertheless disregards that risk' 4 "by failing
to take reasonable measures to abate it.""' 5 Although the Court did
recognize in Farmer "that deliberate indifference to the substantial
risk of sexual assault violates prisoners' rights under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment,"'1 6 this
standard makes Eighth Amendment challenges to sexual abuse in
prisons almost impossible to litigate successfully." ' The Third," 8
Fifth,"19 Sixth, 120 Ninth,12' and Tenth 2 2 Circuits have all denied such
109. See, e.g., Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857,861 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that "severe
or repetitive sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer can be 'objectively, sufficiently
serious' enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation").
110. Compare Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452-53 (D. Del. 1999) (holding
that prison guard's sexual intercourse with plaintiff was a per se violation of the Eighth
Amendment) with Carrigan v. Delaware, 957 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Del. 1997) (holding that
the same plaintiff did not establish deliberate indifference of prison officials).
111. 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
112. Id. at 829-30.
113. Id. at 831.
114. Id. at 837-39.
115. Id. at 847.
116. Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 15601 (West 2005) (citing Farmer).
117. Laderberg, supra note 21, at 330; see also Dinos, supra note 51, at 282-85
(analyzing the difficulties women face in litigating Eighth Amendment claims).
118. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
119. Downey v. Denton County, Tex., 119 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1997).
120. Long v. McGinnis, 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996).
121. Fernandez v. San Francisco, 124 Fed.Appx. 581 (9th Cir. 2005).
122. Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1303 (10th Cir. 1998); Hovater v. Robinson,
1 F.3d 1063, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993). But see Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179, 1180-81
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claims by female litigants. Some courts also refuse to recognize
sexual harassment as an Eighth Amendment violation.
12 3
The Tenth Circuit's treatment of sexual assault in Hovater v.
Robinson is particularly relevant to this note. The plaintiff in Hovater
sued the county and the county sheriff for violations of her Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights after a male prison guard raped
her. 12 4 The plaintiff argued that the sheriff had actual knowledge of
the risk inherent in leaving male guards alone with female inmates
because the prison had a policy against such supervision.125 Although
the Court recognized that the prison guard had violated the plain-
tiffs constitutional rights, it rejected her argument that the sheriff
had knowledge of the risk and therefore ruled against her.'26 The
court held that the policy against cross-gender supervision was in
place for the protection of prison guards from fraudulent complaints
and not for the protection of inmates against actual harms.'27 The
Court further held that a decision in the inmate's favor would
"require the conclusion that every male guard is a risk to the bodily
integrity of a female inmate whenever the two are left alone. ''128
In Farmer, the Court stressed that the Eighth Amendment only
applies to "punishments" and not to "conditions,"'29 and the Eighth
Amendment has indeed proven virtually impotent to protect pris-
oners subjected to cross-gender supervision conditions. One of the
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff inmate raised a genuine issue of material fact
regarding county sheriffs knowledge of a substantial risk of sexual assault).
123. See, e.g., Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
female prison guards did not violate the Eighth Amendment by coercing male prisoners
to undress and masturbate for the guards' entertainment); Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335,
1338-39 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that sexual harassment could constitute an Eighth
Amendment claim but ruling against the prisoner because he had "tacitly admitted that
he bore some responsibility for" their sexual relationship); Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d
857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that sexual abuse can constitute an Eighth Amend-
ment violation but rejecting plaintiffs claims because the alleged verbal harassment and
sexual touching were not "objectively, sufficiently serious"); Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d
1034, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling in favor of defendant prison guard who had made
sexual comments to plaintiff inmate and had entered her cell while she was sleeping);
Ornelas v. Giurbino, 358 F. Supp. 2d 955, 963 (S.D. Cal. 2005) ('Plaintiff cannot state an
Eight[h] Amendment claim on alleged verbal sexual harassment."); Minifield v. Butikofer,
298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that a "prisoner may state an Eighth
Amendment claim under § 1983 for sexual harassment only if the alleged harassment
was sufficiently harmful, that is, a departure from the 'evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society,' and the defendant acted with intent to
harm the prisoner").
124. Hovater, 1 F.3d at 1064-66.
125. Id. at 1068.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
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few successes in this area occurred in Jordan v. Gardner, in which
female prison inmates challenged the Washington Correction Center
for Women's policy requiring male prison guards to conduct random,
non-emergency clothed pat-frisks of female inmates. 3 ' The Ninth
Circuit held that this policy violated the inmates' Eighth Amend-
ment rights because it created "unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain."131
C. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Fourth and Eighth Amendments have proven ineffective
at protecting prisoners from sexual assault and from degrading and
often dangerous cross-gender supervision policies. Prisoners have
met with equal failure when claiming protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment, but this section argues that these suits result
in failure only because prisoners claim a general .right to privacy
under the Fourteenth Amendment instead of a more specific right
to remain free from bodily intrusions.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to include an implicit right to privacy. The Supreme Court
first explicitly recognized this general right to privacy in Griswold
v. Connecticut,'32 although tacit recognition of such a right by the
Court arguably extends as far back as 1891.' In Griswold the Court
held that the right to privacy arose from penumbras of the Bill of
Rights and not from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 3 4 Less than a decade later, the Court again recognized the
right to privacy in Roe v. Wade but held that the source of that right
was the Fourteenth Amendment's "concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action."'35 The right to privacy protects inter-
ests in "avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and "independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions.' 13 ' Although the
Court has not defined the full reach of the substantive due process
right to privacy, 1 7 it stated in Roe 38 that the right protects decisions
130. 986 F.2d 1521, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1993).
131. Id. at 1524. However, the district court narrowly tailored its injunction to prohibit
only "routine or random clothed body searches of female inmates which include touching
of and around breasts and genital areas[] by male corrections officers." Id. at 1531.
132. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the general right to privacy exists in the
penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
133. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
134. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
135. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
136. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
137. Carey v. Population Services, Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
138. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
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regarding "marriage,139 procreation, 140 contraception,14 1 family rela-
tionships,'42 and child rearing and education." '43 The Court has also
recognized in recent years that the right extends to the right to re-
fuse medical treatment14 and the right to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct.'45 Against this backdrop of privacy rights, prison
inmates have achieved little success when challenging cross-gender
supervision policies as violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Most appellate courts address prisoners' privacy rights with respect
to the Fourth Amendment, 46 but the Seventh Circuit has specifically
addressed prisoners' rights to bodily integrity under the Supreme
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence.
In 1994, the Seventh Circuit addressed a male inmate's con-
stitutional challenge to cross-gender strip searches in Canedy v.
Boardman.147 The plaintiff, Canedy, alleged that two female prison
guards strip-searched him, violating his right to privacy.14 The Court
held that Canedy had rights to privacy and bodily integrity under
the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, rights
that specifically protected him against unreasonable and unwanted
exposure of his naked body to members of the opposite sex.
149
One year later, the Seventh Circuit distinguished cross-gender
strip-searches from cross-gender surveillance in Johnson v. Phelan.5 °
In Phelan, the court held that the plaintiffs substantive due process
right to privacy did not prohibit female guards from monitoring him
while showering and using the toilet. 5'
The Ninth Circuit has also recognized a right to privacy in one's
body. In York v. Story the Court of Appeals held that police officers
violated the plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy when
they photographed her in indecent positions against her objections
139. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
140. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
141. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
142. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
143. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
144. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
145. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
146. See supra Part II.A.
147. 16 F.3d 183, 184 (7th Cir. 1994).
148. Id. Canedy also challenged the prison's policy ofallowing female guards to monitor
prisoners in various states of undress and while showering and defecating. Id.
149. Id. at 185-86.
150. 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995).
151. Id. at 145-47.
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and distributed the photographs throughout the office. 152 The Court
refused to extend that protection to prisoners in Grummet v. Rushen.1
53
In these cases and in cases addressing prisoners' Fourth Amend-
ment rights to privacy, prisoners have alleged only a general right to
privacy. Focusing a court's attention on the right to remain free from
rape makes prisoners' claims appear more reasonable and makes
prison practices appear less reasonable. The following sections ad-
dress the existence of such a constitutional right and how prisoners
can apply that right to obtain injunctive relief from cross-gender
supervision.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRISONERS TO REMAIN FREE
FROM RAPE
Many state legislatures have passed laws explicitly giving in-
mates a statutory right to remain free from rape by prison guards,TM
but plaintiffs can also challenge cross-gender supervision policies
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by claiming a constitutionally protected right
to remain free from rape. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments and the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of bodily integrity both support the notion that female
prisoners have a constitutionally protected right to remain free from
rape at the hands of prison guards.
First, a number of courts have reached the somewhat obvious
conclusion that prison guards violate the Eighth Amendment when
they sexually assault prison inmates. 5 These decisions fall in line
with the even broader right recognized by the Supreme Court in
Farmer v. Brennan that prison guards can be held liable for deliberate
indifference to rapes perpetrated by other inmates.15 6 Furthermore,
152. 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963).
153. 779 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1985); see also supra Part II.A.
154. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WOMEN IN PRISON: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY
CORRECTIONAL STAFF 3 (1999).
155. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the Eighth
Amendment right of prisoners to be free from sexual abuse was unquestionably clearly
established prior to the time of this alleged assault, and no reasonable prison guard could
possibly have believed otherwise"); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that sufficiently serious sexual abuse by prison guards can constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation); Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corr. v. Dist.
of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634, 665 (D.D.C. 1994) ("Rape, coerced sodomy, unsolicited
touching of women prisoners' vaginas, breasts and buttocks by prison employees are
'simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society."') (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970)), affd in part and
modified in part, 899 F.Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995).
156. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (holding that "gratuitously allowing the beating or rape
of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objectiv[e]") (internal
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the Supreme Court held in Hudson v. McMillian that a guard's use
of excessive physical force against a prison inmate can be a vio-
lation of the Eighth Amendment even if the use of such force leaves
minimal physical injuries. 5 ' These cases make clear that female
prison inmates have an Eighth Amendment right to remain free from
sexual assault while in prison. 5 '
The Fourteenth Amendment also provides support for the
notion that all United States citizens, including prisoners, have a
right to remain free from rape at the hands of government officials.
In Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected the right to remain free from "unjustified
intrusions on personal security," including "freedom from bodily re-
straint and punishment."'59 The Supreme Court has not explicitly
held whether this Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of bodily in-
tegrity includes a right to remain free from rape by public offi-
cials,16 ° although it decided a case concerning such facts in 1997 in
U.S. v. Lanier.6'
In Lanier, the Court considered the conviction of a state judge
under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for "criminally violating the constitutional
rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while [he] served
as a state judge."'62 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals initially up-
held the conviction,'63 but upon rehearing en banc, the Court re-
versed that decision. 16 4 In so reversing, the Court held that sexual
assault could not be a constitutional violation because the Supreme
Court had not yet held as such.'65 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that a specific constitutional right could exist absent a Supreme
Court ruling recognizing such a right under fundamentally similar
facts. 66 In effect, the Court gave lower courts considerably more dis-
cretion in recognizing constitutional rights. Since the Court passed
down that decision, at least three Courts of Appeals have held that
quotations omitted).
157. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
158. Nevertheless, as stated above, female prisoners rarely are able to litigate such
claims successfully. See supra Part III.C.
159. 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
160. Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 1998).
161. 520 U.S. 259, 262 (1997).
162. Id.
163. U.S. v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 645 (6th Cir. 1994).
164. U.S. v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996).
165. Id. at 1388.
166. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 268-70.
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the Fourteenth Amendment includes a right to remain free from
sexual assault by public officials.'67
Even before Lanier, some courts addressed the question of
whether such a right exists in specific contexts. In Doe v. Taylor
Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit held that the right of
students to remain free from sexual assault by their teachers existed
and was clearly established as early as 1987.168 The Third Circuit
also had held that students have a right to remain free from sexual
assault by public officials prior to the Supreme Court's holding in
Lanier.169 In summary, ample precedent supports the notion that all
citizens have a right to remain free from sexual assault, a right that
female prisoners can raise in civil rights actions against the prison
officials incarcerating them.
IV. ELIMINATING CROSS-GENDER SUPERVISION IN PRISONS
Shifting the focus of cross-gender supervision challenges to the
right to remain free from rape by public officials has two benefits.
The first benefit is that this shift necessitates analyzing prisoners'
claims under a standard that is less deferential to prison adminis-
trators. The second benefit is that prisoners can use this theory to
challenge cross-gender supervision policies because these policies
create substantially higher rates of sexual assault.1
71
A. The Standard of Review
One of the difficulties that inmates face when raising any con-
stitutional challenge is the overwhelming deference granted to prison
167. Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that "rape com-
mitted under color of state law" violates the right to bodily integrity and "is therefore
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a deprivation of liberty without due process of
law"); Rogers v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 152 F.3d 790, 795-96 (8th Cir. 1998) (collecting
cases in support of their recognition of the "the due process right to be free of unwelcome
'sexual fondling and touching or other egregious sexual contact' by a police officer acting
under color of law"); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620,628 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that rape
by a police officer violated the victim's substantive due process right "not to be subjected
by anyone acting under color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm").
168. 15 F.3d 443,455 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a student's "substantive due process
right to be free from sexual abuse and violations of her bodily integrity").
169. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989).
170. If female prisoners were able to successfully litigate such claims, male prisoners
might be able to challenge cross-gender supervision in male correctional facilities under
the theory that such policies violate the Equal Protection clause. Analysis of such an argu-
ment lies beyond the scope of this note.
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administrators under Turner v. Safley'7' and Farmer v. Brennan.172
Challenging male supervision of female prisoners as creating an
atmosphere tolerant to the deprivation of these women's right to
remain free from rape would either invoke a stricter standard of
review or would increase the inmate's chances of success under the
Turner v. Safley framework.
One should first note that the Turner v. Safley framework may
be inapplicable when the deprived right is narrowly defined as the
right to remain free from rape by public officials. In Johnson v.
California, an equal protection case, the Supreme Court chose to
forego the Turner framework and subjected the prison practice at
issue to strict scrutiny review.'73 The court stated that the Turner
framework was only applicable to those rights that are "inconsistent
with proper incarceration."'74 Cases in which courts have applied the
Turner framework in the past are distinguishable because in those
cases the prisoners alleged a violation of a general right to privacy
rather than a specific, narrow privacy right that is not inconsistent
with incarceration.'75 Asserting that prisoners lose their right to
remain free from rape by public officials upon entering a prison or
that this right is "inconsistent with proper incarceration" are difficult
arguments to make.
Even if a court were to apply the Turner test to cross-gender
supervision practices, the prisoners' claims would withstand such
scrutiny.'76 The first factor considered by courts under the Turner
test is whether the policy is 'reasonably related' to legitimate
penological objectives."'77 Cross-gender supervision policies appear
to serve only one legitimate penological purpose, that of assuring
equal employment in prisons.' However, because the Court held
in Dothard that prisons have no obligation to provide jobs for
opposite-sex prison guards, 7 9 courts must question the strength
and validity of this interest.
171. 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
172. 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
173. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502, 515 (2005).
174. Id. at 510 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
175. See supra Part III.
176. The four factors courts consider when applying the Turner test are listed supra
text accompanying note 64.
177. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987).
178. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Stalder, 78 Fed. Appx. 987, 989 (5th Cir. 2003); Somers v.
Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th
Cir. 1995); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1990).
179. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
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Second, female prisoners have no alternative means by which
to exercise their right to remain free from rape.8 ° In fact, because
the right to remain free from rape is a negative freedom rather than
a positive right, one cannot truly exercise it at all. The right to remain
free from rape is by its very nature a binary right, one that a prisoner
either has or does not have.
Ending or limiting cross-gender supervision policies would as-
suredly have a "ripple effect" on prison populations,1 8 1 but that effect
would be a highly positive one. Such elimination or limitation would
allow female prisoners to live free from fears of sexual violence at
the hands of male guards. The only negative effect of ending or limit-
ing cross-gender supervision policies is that it could lead to a drop in
the number of jobs available to women in the prison system if leg-
islatures chose to abandon such policies in both female and male
prison facilities.8 2 Nevertheless, the government's duty to protect
prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights surely outweighs any obliga-
tion it may have to preserve jobs for female prison guards.
Finally, easy, obvious alternatives exist to cross-gender supervi-
sion policies that accommodate female prisoners' rights to remain
free from rape.'83 For example, prisons could accommodate these
rights and still satisfy security concerns by instituting policies that
substantially limit the access of male prison guards to female pris-
oners to include only distant supervision. 4 Prisons could also choose
only to hire guards of the same sex as the prisoners. 85 The fact that
some prisons have adopted such policies in the past serves as
evidence that these policies are both obvious and relatively easy
to implement.
180. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 ("A second factor relevant in determining the
reasonableness of a prison restriction ... is whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.").
181. See id. ("When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant'ripple
effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to
the informed discretion of corrections officials.").
182. Because men constitute a disproportionate percentage of the prison population,
women would have fewer employment opportunities in prison administration if the
government excluded them from working in male facilities. See BUREAU OFJUST. STAT.,
supra note 50, at 5, 8.
183. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 ("Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence
of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.").
184. See, e.g., Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1985).
185. See, e.g., Everson v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 739-40 (6th Cir. 2004);
UN Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 6 ("Women prisoners shall be attended and
supervised only by women officers.").
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B. Ending Cross-Gender Supervision in Women's Prisons
In Helling v. McKinney, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner
could sue for an injunction under the Eighth Amendment to prevent
injuries before they happened."8 6 The Court refused to distinguish be-
tween current harms suffered by prisoners and harms that prisoners
would suffer in the future if they did not receive relief."8 7
Before granting injunctive relief to a prisoner, he must show
not only that his present conditions of confinement create a risk but
that the risk is "so grave that it violates contemporary standards of
decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words,
the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one
that today's society chooses to tolerate."' Plaintiffs can easily satisfy
this part of the analysis since rape is without question an unspeak-
able crime of violence that society does not tolerate.'8 9
The primary hurdle for a female inmate requesting such an
injunction would be proving the causal link between cross-gender
supervision policies and the risk of rape at the hands of male prison
guards. The Tenth Circuit in Hovater v. Robinson expressed a fear
that holding prison administrators responsible for harms resulting
from cross-gender supervision would imply that all male guards pose
a danger to the bodily integrity of all female inmates. 9 ' While the
proposition that all men would inevitably sexually assault female
inmates if given the chance is clearly false, leaving male guards
alone with female inmates is sufficiently dangerous to warrant an
injunction against such practices.
Some studies from the 1990s address this causal link and reach
the conclusion that the risk is severe, but they fail to provide rigorous
statistical evidence supporting this conclusion. ' In at least one class
action suit, the plaintiffs showed the risks of psychological and other
harms inherent in cross-gender supervision through expert testi-
mony. 192 Similar expert testimony could prove fruitful for plaintiffs
attempting to show the risk of rape inherent in such supervision. In
186. 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 36.
189. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 423 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Such brutality is the equivalent of torture, and is offensive to any modern
standard of human dignity."); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 853 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993).
191. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 12; Coomaraswamy, supra note 13, at
15; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23.
192. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (9th Cir. 1993).
CROSS-GENDER SUPERVISION IN PRISONS
some class action suits, plaintiffs have met their burden of proof
through the testimony of numerous prison inmates regarding rapes
at the hands of guards.193 Such testimony would also bolster plain-
tiffs' claims when seeking an injunction against cross-gender super-
vision policies.
Finally, statistical evidence bolsters the claims of female inmates
seeking injunctions against cross-gender supervision. First, although
it is by no means dispositive, one should note that ninety-nine per-
cent of those arrested or convicted of rape are male,"' and male
staff are reportedly the perpetrators of "the overwhelming majority
of complaints of sexual abuse by female inmates against staff."'195
These statistics at the very least imply that same-sex supervision pol-
icies pose a lesser risk than cross-gender supervision policies. Second,
pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics of the United States Department of Justice must
provide a "comprehensive statistical review and analysis of the in-
cidence and effects of prison rape."'96 Although the first report under
this statute sheds little light on the causes of prison rape, 97 future
reports may provide more information that plaintiffs could use to
show the effects of cross-gender supervision on the frequency of
prison rape.
Assuming that a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs meets the burden
of proving that cross-gender supervision policies lead inevitably (or
at least are a substantial factor that leads to) the rape of female in-
mates, correct application of current federal law necessitates grant-
ing relief to plaintiffs. Upon making such a finding, courts must
reach the conclusion that cross-gender supervision policies either are
a violation of prisoners' rights to remain free from rape by public
officials or are policies that create an atmosphere tolerant of such
violations. If so, then the plaintiff has a cognizable civil claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which she can request an injunction.'98 When
193. See Laderberg, supra note 21, at 327.
194. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT at v (1997) available at http://www
.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf ("Federal statistical series obtaining data on arrested or
convicted persons - Uniform Crime Reports, National Judicial Reporting Program, and
National Corrections Reporting Program - show a remarkable similarity in the charac-
teristics of those categorized as rapists: 99 in 100 are male. .
195. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 12, at 38-39.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 15603 (Supp. IV 2005).
197. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 25.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
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addressing the plaintiffs § 1983 claim, the court must subject the
policies either to strict scrutiny or to the Turner standard of review.
As stated in the previous section, such policies cannot withstand
either level of scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
A society that allows female prisoners to live each day in con-
stant fear of being sexually abused is guilty of the most heinous form
of barbarism. Nevertheless, sexual abuse of female prisoners by
prison guards is a rampant phenomenon that the law has thus far
proved impotent to stop. Cross-gender supervision policies exacer-
bate the problem by placing women in situations in which they have
no escape from their attackers. Clearly establishing that prisoners
have a right to remain free from rape by public officials promises to
stem the tide of sexual abuse while simultaneously improving con-
ditions of confinement for female prisoners by restricting prisons
from adopting cross-gender supervision policies.
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